Abstract
We investigate a novel intuitionistic modal logic, called Propositional Lax Logic, with promising applications to the formal veri cation of computer hardware. The logic has emerged from an attempt to express correctness`up to' behavioural constraints | a central notion in hardware veri cation | as a logical modality. The resulting logic is unorthodox in several respects. As a modal logic it is special since it features a single modal operator that has a avour both of possibility and of necessity. As for hardware veri cation it is special since it is an intuitionistic rather than classical logic which so far has been the basis of the great majority of approaches. Finally, its models are unusual since they feature worlds with inconsistent information and furthermore the only frame condition is that the -frame be a subrelation of the -frame.
In the paper we will provide the motivation for Propositional Lax Logic and present several technical results. We will investigate some of its proof-theoretic properties, and present a cut-elimination theorem for a standard Gentzen-style sequent presentation of the logic. We further show soundness and completeness for several classes of fallible two-frame Kripke models. In this framework we present a concrete and rather natural class of models from hardware veri cation such that the modality models correctness up to timing constraints.
Finally, we explore the expressibility of the -free fragment of the logic over these concrete constraint models. We obtain decidability of this fragment, which coincides with the stable form of Maksimova's intermediate logic L .
Motivation
It is good engineering practice to think of the synthesis of a hardware device as proceeding through numerous levels of abstraction. The attempt to formalize this process in mathematical logic for the purpose of formal veri cation, however, faces a major obstacle: behavioural abstractions are genuine mathematical abstractions only up to behavioural constraints, i.e. under certain restrictions imposed on the device's environment. Timing constraints on input signals form an important class of such restrictions. Since correctness across abstraction levels is only correctness up to constraints, rather than correctness proper, the ambient formalism no longer provides a (uniform) notion of correctness across the abstraction boundary. This abstract formulation elides, of course, much concrete-level detail. As a speci cation of static behaviour it is valid only as long as gate delays can be ignored. This is, however, not always the case. In the design of real circuits delays can cause considerable grief. Races, hazards, or glitches are delay-related phenomena that may render simple boolean reasoning unsound. In the real circuit corresponding to gure 1 for instance, a 1 ! 0 transition on input B may produce a 0 ! 1 ! 0 glitch on C even if A is constant 0, viz. whenever the delay through the inverter is su ciently small compared to that through the or-gate. Thus, in the presence of propagation delays, the above speci cation is unsound. So, how can we justify the`ideal' abstract description in terms of the more concrete level? Well, the best we can expect is that instead of the original speci cation the`real' behaviour satis es but an approximation like B stable (A = 0 (after some delay C = 0));
weakened by the stability constraint`B stable' to rule out the glitch, and by the timing constraint`after some delay' to account for the input/output propagation delay. The trouble is that both constraints refer to time and thus belong to the concrete level of timed signals. Thus, the dominant formalism of Boolean algebra, or propositional logic for that matter, is not adequate to capture correctness of the timing abstraction. No problem, one might say, since of course at the low level one can make things precise, say by ((8 Though the state of the art in formal hardware veri cation this cannot be the answer as it jeopardizes the crucial distinction between the abstraction levels. We are throwing overboard the abstractness of the Boolean approach, and we are back where we started, entangled in the nitty-gritty details of exact timing veri cation. Fortunately, there is a middle way of tackling the problem of approximative and incomplete abstractions: we employ a weakened notion of correctness, viz. correctness-up-toconstraints, and formalize it as a logical modality. The example circuit's behaviour then would be speci ed by (A = 0 (C = 0));
to be read as \under some constraint, if A is low, then under some constraint, C is 0". Thus, the modality is used to account for the stability and timing constraints, which are no longer part of the speci cation but of the semantic model and of the correctness proofs. The technical advantages of this idea have been worked out in Mendler, 1990 , Mendler, 1993 . Given the great variety of uses that the notion of`constraint' nds in hardware engineering, a general advantage of this framework is to provide a precise de nition of constraint correctness that permits more or less arbitrary instantiation while yielding useful metamathematical results. To introduce a concrete instance of this framework and to explore some its potentials is the goal of this paper.
Propositional Lax Logic
We shall present a concrete formal calculus, Propositional Lax Logic, conceived along the lines set out in Mendler, 1993] . The term`lax logic' is chosen to indicate the`looseness' associated with the notion of correctness up to constraints. Propositional Lax Logic, PLL, is an intuitionistic propositional calculus with a single modality . The intuitive interpretation of M is \for some constraint c, formula M holds under c". Clearly, di erent notions of constraint will have di erent properties, and thus will give rise to di erent axioms for . The generic interpretation leads to the following three axioms:
Axiom R says \if M holds outright then it holds under a (trivial) constraint"; M says \if under some constraint, M holds under another constraint, then M holds under a (combined) constraint"; nally, F says \if M implies N then if M holds under a constraint, N holds under a (the same) constraint." However innocent each of these axioms may appear in this informal reading, their combination results in a rather strange modality. Indeed, has a avour of both possibility and of necessity without being one or the other. Axioms R and M are typical of possibility while F is typical for necessity. On the other hand, in standard systems, say Lewis' modal system S4 Chellas, 1980] , the axiom R is never adopted for necessity while F never for possibility, and in fact they would trivialize the modalities. The second noteworthy feature of PLL is that it is an intuitionistic rather than classical logic which so far has been the basis of the great majority of approaches in the area of hardware veri cation. In Mendler, 1990 , Mendler, 1993 ] the intuitionistic nature has been exploited to extract constraints from proofs. Yet, dropping the Excluded Middle is not merely for pragmatic reasons: PLL is essentially intuitionistic in the sense that assuming the Excluded Middle and the axiom : false trivializes , i.e. M becomes provably equivalent to M. This is another indication for the`strangeness' of in the context of standard classical modal logics. Of course, we hope this paper will convince the reader that the modality is actually a very natural one.
So, just what kind of modality is ? Why should it be interesting at all and how does it relate to correctness-up-to constraints? In Mendler, 1990 , Mendler, 1993 is motivated by a proof-theoretic interpretation. The present paper attempts to justify the axioms and their constraint interpretation by model-theoretic means. We will show that PLL has a natural class of Kripke models for which it is sound and complete. Two concrete subclasses of such models will be presented obtaining two concrete constraint interpretations of . These concrete models verify that PLL has nontrivial expressiveness and illustrate the bene t of dropping Excluded Middle and : false. But before we get to the technical results it may be appropriate to give some general justi cation of .
(1) Consider the most simple constraint interpretation, viz. M C M, where C is an arbitrary but xed constraint. Under this encoding all three axioms R, M, F become tautologies of (intuitionistic) propositional logic. With modi cation, this generalizes to a set C of constraints: M C 2 C: C M (see Mendler, 1990] Curry, 1957] . These lectures contain some sketchy remarks on a 3 modality endowed with axiom schemata that are essentially equivalent to the ones we are adopting for . The present paper may be seen as giving a model-theoretic account of Curry's proof-theoretic 3 and in particular of LJZ.
(2) A second motivation for can be drawn from general type theory. The formal properties of viewed as an unary type constructor are precisely the data of a strong closure operator, or strong monad familiar from category theory. In fact, the propositions-as-types principle which yields an equivalence between the Intuitionistic Propositional Calculus (IPC) and bi-Cartesian closed categories can be extended to an equivalence between PLL and bi-Cartesian closed categories with a strong monad. This categorical structure is also known as the computational lambda calculus c Moggi, 1989] . The application of c as a calculus of proofs for PLL has been investigated by Benton et al. Benton et al., 1993] (there the logic is called CL).
(3) The third motivation for is the possibility of a timing analysis of combinational circuits. In an equivalent presentation of PLL we can replace F by the axiom S : ( M^ N) (M^N) and the additional inference rule \from M N infer M N". One may now establish a direct correspondence between the axioms used in verifying the functional behaviour of a combinational circuit and the computation of a data-dependent timing constraint: R corresponds to a wire, which involves zero delay 0; M deals with the sequential composition of circuits, which involves the addition of delays +, and S e ects the parallel composition of circuits, which amounts to the maximum operation max on delays. In other words, by systematic translation of proofs in PLL into a term over the delay algebra (Nat; 0; +; max) we can extract veri cation-driven, and thus data-dependent, timing information. This is essentially an interpretation, in the sense of (2), in a concrete c calculus.
The previous remarks point out that however strange may appear as a modality of logic it is a rather natural object well-known from other mathematical contexts. While in the shape of strong monads already has proven a very useful tool in the semantics of functional programming languages it is relatively unexplored qua logic. This work takes a logical approach and provides an independent motivation of from hardware veri cation. Based on this concrete interpretation the analysis given in this paper heads o in new directions.
The Logic
The formulas of PLL are generated by the grammar M :: = A j true j false j M^M j M _ M j M M j :M j M where A ranges over a countably in nite set of propositional constants pcs = fp 0 ; p 1 ; : : :g. From the sub-formula property (iii) we get the decidability of PLL.
Theorem 3.7 (Decidability) PLL is decidable.
We have seen that PLL combines a number of properties (in particular deduction theorem and the interpretation M = true) which are rather strong for a modal logic. Although from a formal point of view every unary syntactic operator may be called a`modality' one wonders whether the proof-theoretic properties of are not in fact too strong for it to be an interesting modality in a semantical sense. In the next section we show that indeed can be given a proper and nontrivial semantics in terms of Kripke models. IK, by Fischer-Servi Fischer-Servi, 1980] for the class of ( )-IC systems, and by Ewald Ewald, 1986] for an intuitionistic tense logic. The approach taken here most closely follows Plotkin and Stirling, 1986] in using one set of worlds but two separate frame relations to interpret and .
Here we identify a natural class of Kripke models for which PLL is sound and complete. The models are two-frame Kripke models with a single frame relation and fallible worlds. Troelstra and van Dalen, 1988, Dummett, 1977] . As we will show, in our context, fallible worlds arise naturally from the constraint interpretation.
De nition Some remarks concerning our de nition of validity are in order. First, one notes that fallible worlds validate all formulas and that : false is not valid in general. Second, the clause for validity of N is a 89 statement. This endows with properties of both possibility and of necessity. A direct consequence is that is hereditary w.r.t. the intuitionistic frame R i without further imposing a con uence frame condition as in the models for IK Plotkin and Stirling, 1986] . Another consequence is that this semantics of does not validate the scheme (M _N) M _ N. Both this scheme and : false are generally adopted for modality 3, even for intuitionistic logics such as IK and apparently also by the class ( )-IC of logics considered by Fischer-Servi in Fischer-Servi, 1980] . We will present concrete constraint models falsifying as well as validating these axioms. Finally notice that there is no point in de ning a`necessity' modality, in contrast to IK. Its One then shows by induction on derivations that if ?` is derivable then ?` is valid in all models. We now proceed to prove completeness of PLL w.r.t. Kripke constraint models. We will follow the standard idea of constructing a counter model for every formula that is not derivable. The counter model employs a suitable generalization of the Lindenbaum construction, in which worlds are triples (?; ; ) of sets of formulas, called theories, subject to an abstract consistency condition which re ects the semantical rôle of its components (cf. Fitting, 1983] ).
The model will be set up so that at a world w = (?; ; ) the formulas in ? are validated at w, the formulas in are falsi ed at w, and the formulas in are falsi ed at every world R m reachable from w. The sets are a special feature of our completeness proof and of PLL. They are introduced to make up for the fact that falsity of a formula M cannot be expressed by including M (or a sub-formula of M) in ? or . We need to keep track of these separately.
Another special feature of the proof is the notion of consistency. A theory (?; ; ) is consistent if for every choice of formulas N 1 ; : : : ; N n 2 , and K 1 ; : : : ; K k 2 , such that n + k 1, it is not the case that
This de nition is somewhat weaker than one might expect as it excludes the case k = n = 0. The disjunction on the right must always be nonempty, with the e ect that the theories (?; ;; ;), for any choice of ?, are consistent for trivial reasons. The point here is that we take the empty disjunction to be the empty formula rather than and by building up a hierarchy of consistent theories (? 0 ; 0 ; 0 ) (? 1 ; 1 ; 1 ) (? n ; n ; n ) (? n+1 ; n+1 ; n+1 ) starting with (? 0 ; 0 ; 0 ) = (?; ; ) and such that (? n+1 ; n+1 ; n+1 ) = (? n fB n g; n ; n ) if it is consistent, otherwise (? n+1 ; n+1 ; n+1 ) = (? n ; n fB n g; n fB n g) if it is consistent, otherwise (? n+1 ; n+1 ; n+1 ) = (? n ; n fB n g; n ). Then, (? ; ; ) is a maximally consistent theory. Note, if ?`false, then by consistency of (?; ; ) we must have = = ;, in which case the above construction will produce the maximally consistent extension (?; ;; ;).
The second part of the lemma is not hard to verify. It uses the properties of the deduction relation`P LL . We can now proceed to de ne a generic Kripke constraint model C = (C ; R m ; R i ; V ; F ) which falsi es all unprovable formulas. As the elements in C we take the maximally consistent theories T = (?; ; Proof: The lemma is proven by induction on the formula M. Here only the cases M N and M N K will be treated, as they are the ones that drive the model along R i and R m . All other cases are achieved`on-the-spot' using lemma 4.4. It will be convenient to express the consistency condition for theories (?; ; ) in more concise but less precise form as ? 6 PLL _ _ _ ;
noting that if the right hand side is the empty formula then the statement is trivially true.
Suppose N 2 ? and T 1 is such that T R i T 1 . Then T 1 = (? 1 ; 1 ; 1 ) and ? ? 1 . We consider the theory (? 1 fNg; ;; 1 ). We claim that this theory is consistent. Assume otherwise, then we must have ? 1 ; N`P LL in PLL(from axiom schemes A A and (A B) ( A B)) we conclude that ? 1 ; N`P LL W 1 . But since N 2 ? ? 1 this contradicts the consistency of T 1 . By lemma 4.4 we can now nd a maximally consistent extension T 0 = (? 0 ; 0 ; 0 ) of (? 1 fNg; ;; 1 ). By de nition, T 1 R m T 0 , and by the induction hypothesis on N, T 0 j = N. Thus we have T j = N.
Suppose N 2 . Consider the theory (?; ;; fNg), which must be consistent for otherwise ?`P LL N, which contradicts consistency of T . Now take a maximally consistent extension T 0 = (? 0 ; 0 ; 0 ) of (?; ;; fNg). We claim that for all T 1 , T 0 R m T 1 , T 1 6 j = N. Let Thus, (? 2 ; 2 ; 2 )R i T 0 which completes the proof that the presence of the axioms (X_Y ) ( X_ Y ) forces R m and R i in the canonical model to be mutually con uent.
Three General Constraint Models
In this paper we give two variants of concrete models for PLL. The rst class of models is Strictly speaking, the two conditions are not pure`frame' conditions as they involve the validity of C and thus the valuation. By`characterized' we mean that the class of models satisfying the given conditions is the largest class of models for PLL C closed under any change of valuation that does not modify the validity of C.
Proof: The rst conditions says that from every world w there is a C-validating world reachable via R m . This is necessary and su cient to ensure validity of (C M) M (For necessity put M = C). The second condition says that if w is already validating C then w is a terminal w.r.t. R m . This is necessary and su cient to ensure the other direction M (C M) (for necessity put M = A where A is a propositional constant not occurring in C). Note that the restriction to antisymmetric constraint Kripke models is not a severe one, as every constraint Kripke model is (elementarily) equivalent to an antisymmetric one. With the semantical characterization at hand we can now try to construct concrete models Proof: The rst frame condition says that from every world w validating C a fallible world is accessible via R m . This is necessary and su ent for validity of (C _ M) M (for necessity put M = false). The second condition says that if w is not validating C then it is a terminal w.r.t. R m . This is necessary and su cient to ensure the other direction M (C _ M) (for necessity put M = A where A is a pcs not occurring in C). Proof: One can construct a derivation verifying the statement by induction on M.
Alternatively, one uses the fact that IPC is complete for the class of nite intuitionistic Kripke models (see e.g. Dummett, 1977] ) and shows that on nite models the equivalence is valid semantically. 
Combinational Circuits
The second type of models to be investigated are still more concrete. s; t) 2 V (I)(A) if I(A) is constant 1 throughout s; t), i.e. 8x: s x < t, I(A)(x) = 1.
F(I) is the set of empty intervals s; s).
The set W(I) is clearly nonempty, as it always contains the pairs 0; 0) and 0; 1 One can show that the -free fragment also allows us to specify nontrivial dynamic behaviour: it is possible to specify state and transition invariants, say that two signals may never be 1 at the same time, or in a certain state never switch at the same time. The expressiveness, which ranges from a set of states with arbitrary transitions to no transitions at all, will be investigated in the next section.
Let us call the theory induced by the circuit models MI, for arbitrary timing diagrams I, Circuit-PLL. Now, in view of its nontrivial expressibility it is natural to ask whether The rst axiom scheme has been noted before, it stems from the con uence of both accessibility relations in the circuit models. The second axiom scheme we have encountered implicitly in the semantical discussions above. It shows how depends upon the fallible nature of the models: if the axiom : false excluding fallible nodes is added Circuit-PLL becomes equivalent to classical boolean algebra. Thus, although the circuit models MI involve time the modal operator is rather di erent from a temporal operator such as eventually'. The third axiom scheme is Gabbay and DeJongh's binary tree formula D 1 Gabbay and DeJongh, 1974] and the fourth Scott's axiom Kreisel and Putnam, 1957] .
Both follow directly from the structure of the circuit models' accessibility relation R i (I).
The last axiom is easy to verify; it re ects the stability of the truth valuation for propositional constants. Note that this axiom does not hold as a scheme since for instance ::(A _ B) A _ B is not valid. This means that Circuit-PLL is a nonstandard logic, i.e. not closed under substitution. We might point out that this feature, of not being closed under substitution, is characteristic for dynamic systems. The functional behaviour of an asynchronous circuit, for instance, is not preserved when substituting a composite circuit for a functionally equivalent primitive subcomponent. Replacing a multi-input AND gate by a cascade of 2-input ANDs, say, may introduce critical hazards that corrupt the functional operation.
7 Expressibility of the -free fragment of Circuit-PLL
We have seen that with the modality we can specify oscillation and termination behaviour in Circuit-PLL. In this section we present some results which show that already the -free fragment can specify nontrivial dynamic behaviour. We also give an upper bound on expressiveness and as a corollary obtain the decidability of -free Circuit-PLL. At this point it deserves mention that -free Circuit-PLL, i.e. the intuitionistic base of Circuit-PLL, coincides with the stable form of Maksimova's intermediate logic L Maksimova, 1986 ], more precisely -free Circuit-PLL = L + f ::A A j A propositional constant g:
This follows from the fact that both theories are generated by e ectively the same class of Kripke models. Thus, the results of this section are also results about stable L . In particular from decidability of -free Circuit-PLL (corollary 7.4 below) the decidability of stable L can be inferred. This connection, however, will not be pursued further in this paper.
In the -free fragment we can restrict ourselves to nite timing diagrams, i.e. those with a nite number of signals which all eventually stabilize: A -free formula is valid i it is valid in all nite timing diagrams. We can further simplify the interpretation noting that validity does not depend on the absolute length of an interval. Thus, we may identify a nite timing diagram over n pcs with its underlying sequence of n-bit states. For instance, the nite interval t 2 ; t 6 ) in gure 5 corresponds to the state sequence 01; 11; 10; 11 where the rst bit corresponds to propositional constant A and the second to B. Since the validity of formulas in the -free fragment is una ected by the presence of empty intervals, we may as well restrict ourselves to non-empty sequences. In order to simplify the analysis further we will restrict ourselves to a nite number of propositional constants p 0 ; : : : ; p pcs?1 , and henceforth all formulas are assumed to be -free formulas built from these atoms. With these observations we may adopt the following more compact interpretation of the -free fragment of Circuit-PLL: Let = B Proof: A routine induction on the structure of M.
The lemma provides an equivalent interpretation in terms of traces in which the expressibility of the -free fragment of Circuit-PLL may be conveniently studied. For w 2 + we will write w j = M rather than w 2 M] ].
A Lower bound on expressibility
First note that conjunctions of literals specify states, so that, for example, the conjunct N := p 0^: p 1^p2 means \p 0 and p 2 are stable at 1, p 1 is stable at 0, i. where S is a set of states and T S S an irre exive, symmetric relation on S. A ti (S; T) can be viewed as an undirected graph, whose vertices are (uniquely labelled by) members of , and whose paths specify a subset P(S; T) of traces. 
Whenever p 2 switches then before or after both p 1 ; p 0 are in the same state (3) Whenever p 1 ; p 0 switch in the same direction then p 2 switches, too.
The reader is invited to check that these conditions precisely specify T CNT and further that they can be expressed by the formula 
Lemma 7.2 shows that in the propositional fragment of Circuit-PLL we can express nontrivial dynamic behaviour. It is evident that this lower bound is not tight. Take the formula p 0 _p 1 , for instance. It states essentially that at any time \at least one of p 0 or p 1 must be 1, and if both are 1 only that bit may switch that has not switched before". This does not correspond to any transition invariant (as de ned above) since the behaviour in state 11 depends on the previous history. Thus, in general, our formulas specify dynamic behaviour with some form of internal memory. In fact, the dynamic behaviour expressible is much richer and includes higher-order transition invariants, as will be seen later in section 8. Yet we cannot expect to express arbitrary memory and some limitations are mentioned in the next section.
Upper bound on expressibility
An upper bound to the expressibility in the -free fragment of Circuit-PLL is given by the regular languages closed under subsequence and insensitive to local reversal, as we now show. Closure under subsequences is immediate from the intuitionistic nature of our interpreta- In this last section we are going to show that a class of formulas in the -free fragment of Circuit-PLL corresponds to generalized transition invariants, more precisely higherorder transition invariants. A higher-order transition invariant is a structure specifying a set of permitted higher-order transitions contained in a trace. The invariants introduced in section 7.1 are special cases of order 0 and 1: A state is a 0-order transition and a (dynamic) state invariant is a 0-order transition invariant de ning a subset of permitted states; a transition in the sense of section 7.1 is a 1 st -order transition de ning an undirected transition between states; in general a transition of order (n+1) is an undirected transition between two n-transitions, and an (n + 1)-order transition invariant speci es a subset of such transitions. The precise de nitions follow below.
De nition 8.1 A (generalized) transition is an element of the set T = S n 0 T n , where T 0 = T 1 = f ft 1 ; t 2 g j t 1 ; t 2 2 T 0 & t 1 6 = t 2 g T n+2 = f ft 1 ; t 2 g j t 1 ; t 2 2 T n+1 & t 1 6 = t 2 & t 1 \ t 2 6 = ; g: The order of a transition t 2 T is the (unique) n 0 with t 2 T n . A transition of order n we call an n-transition.
Thus, a 0-transition is simply a state a 2 , a 1 st -order or 1-transition t = fa; bg is uniquely determined by two distinct states a; b and a 2 nd -order or 2-transition t = ffa; bg; fb; cgg is given by three mutually distinct states a; b; c one of which is a distinguished`pivot' state.
Intuitively, a 0-transition is a degenerate case of a transition, the`non-change' of a given state. A 1-transition t = fa; bg represents an undirected change of state between a and b, and a 2-transition t = ffa; bg; fb; cgg represents a change of a change of states, viz. a change from a change between a and b to a change between b and c with an intermediate pivot state b. We remark that for orders greater than 2 the description is no longer so simple, as e.g. a 3 rd -order or 3-transition is of the form t = fffa; bg; fb; cgg ; ffb; cg; xgg where the 1-transition x is one of fa; cg, fc; dg, fb; dg, where all states a; b; c; d are mutually di erent. Each one of the possibilities for x results in a di erent type of 3-transition. An example of a 3 rd -order transition will be given below in gure 7. Transitions are equipped with a natural ordering relation , the re exive and transitive closure of inverse element-ship, i.e. t 2 T is an immediate -successor of s 2 T i t 2 s.
Intuitively, s t means that transition s contains t as a sub-transition. Clearly, is antisymmetric, whence (T; ) is a partial ordering. The 0-transitions T 0 are the leaves in (T; ) and every t of order n > 0 possesses exactly two distinct immediate -successors To de ne the notion of a generalized transition invariant we need to make precise when a trace w satis es a particular higher-order transition t. Clearly Though on rst glance the ring rules may appear hopelessly partial and nondeterministic the relation is actually a total function. The following proposition justi es interpreting w t as`t is the complete ring behaviour of w'. We will denote the unique t such that w t by (w).
Proposition 8.3 For all w 2 + there exists a unique t 2 T such that w t.
As an illustration of the ring relation gure 7 displays a 3-transition t and a trace w ring t. The example is chosen for = f0; 1g 2 where, for simplicity, we identify with the set of natural numbers f0; 1; 2; 3g under binary coding. It will be convenient to characterize a transition invariant in terms of those transitions that are not permitted by it. Given a transition invariant T, a transition t 2 T is called a T-glitch if t is a -maximal transition outside of T, i.e. t 6 2 T and if t = ft 1 ; t 2 g then both t 1 ; t 2 2 T. We call T an n-transition invariant, or n-ti for short, if all T-glitches have orders less than or equal to n. Let n T be the set of T-glitches of order n, and T = S n 0 n T the set of all T-glitches. Every transition invariant is uniquely determined by T, viz. T = f t 2 T j 8s 2 T: t s g:
In other words: a transition invariant T is the set of all transitions that do not contain any T-glitch. One further shows that a trace w satis es T i there does not exist any s 2 T and w 0 v w such that w 0 s.
We now proceed to determine a characteristic formula n T that approximates a transition invariant T as a speci cation for eliminating glitches up to and including order n. More precisely, if T is a ti then denote by T] n the set T] n = ft 2 T j 8m n: 8s 2 m T: t sg:
One checks that this de nes an approximating sequence of well-de ned transition invariants
Intuitively, T] n removes a glitch of T only up to and including order n, otherwise preserves it. If T is an n-ti, i.e. does not have any glitches above order n, then T] n = T. The characteristic formula n T capturing T] n is constructed simultaneously for all T by induction on n as follows: where we identify subset S T with the induced ti f t 2 T j 9s 2 S: s t g. Note that since is nite both T \ and n+1 T are nite sets.
Theorem 8.5 Let T be an n-transition invariant and w 2 + . Then w j = n T i w satis es T] n .
With an n th -order transition invariant we can specify a dynamic process with internal memory of length n, i.e. whose behaviour depends on a history of length n. A 0-ti (state invariant) speci es a process whose behaviour does not depend on anything: the neighbour states can be chosen arbitrarily from a global set of permitted states independent from the previous history or the present state. A 1-ti speci es memory of length 1, i.e. the set of possible neighbour states depends on the present state, and in an n-ti (n > 1), in general, where the states 0; 1; 2 now are identi ed with the formulas M(0); M(1); M(2), i.e. 0 = M(0) = :p 0^: p 1^: p 3 , and so on. From theorem 8.5 we can conclude that a state sequence w satis es 2 T(012) i it does not contain the subsequence 012 or 210. The reader is invited to check this directly by unfolding the semantics of the formula 2 T(012) . It should now be clear how the counter can be speci ed completely by a conjunction 1 T 1V 2 T(xyz) , where T 1 is a suitable 1-ti and xyz runs through all unwanted 3-state sequences, such as 012 above.
Conclusion
The paper presented a novel intuitionistic modal logic, PLL, a conservative extension of the standard intuitionistic propositional calculus by a new modal operator to capture the notion of`correctness-up-to-constraints'. The advantage of the framework we present here is that it provides a precise de nition of constraint correctness that permits more or less arbitrary instantiation while enjoying an intriguing yet tractable meta-theory. medskip The modality algebraically resembles a strong closure operator or | from a type-theoretic perspective | a strong monad. The main result is that PLL has a natural class of twoframe Kripke models for which it is sound and complete. This provides a satisfactory model-theoretic account of the modality in an intuitionistic setting. On the prooftheoretic side it is shown that PLL, despite being a modal logic, inherits many of the properties of intuitionistic logic, viz. deduction theorem, a simple cut-free sequent calculus, and the disjunction property. We have given a number of concrete models for PLL, one of them motivated from hardware veri cation. We interpret PLL over timing diagrams such that expresses truth up to stabilization. In the resulting theory, Circuit-PLL, one derives safe stabilization information even in the presence of glitches, where the standard classical reasoning is sound only under implicit stabilization assumptions. Some results have been presented demonstrating that this logic is able to express nontrivial stability behaviour and a wide class of transition invariants. The full characterization of expressibility in Circuit-PLL and the existence of nite or complete axiomatizations remain open. A nite axiomatization would establish decidability of and ideally give rise to a cut-free sequent calculus for full Circuit-PLL. As regards expressiveness we conjecture that the upper bound given to the -free fragment of Circuit-PLL in section 7.2 is in fact also a lower bound: if this should turn out to be true, we have the perhaps surprising result that every reversible nite-state automaton, whose states are all initial as well as terminal, can be expressed in this intermediate logic.
For circuits where delays do not invalidate functional correctness, such as synchronous circuits, it is often necessary or advantageous to combine functional and timing analysis so as to derive the`exact' data-dependent delay of combinational circuitry. We believe that PLL can be used to do this with standard proof extraction techniques based on a concrete computational lambda calculus as mentioned in the introductory section 1. 
